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CASE COMMENTS
sale price, and because it provides precedent for application of
Code provisions to certain nonnegotiable or "quasi-negotiable"
instruments, which will increase the security and uniformity
of commercial transactions.
Insurance: Insurers Not Liable for Punitive Damages
Plaintiff was injured as a result of insured's gross and wan-
ton negligence in operating his automobile and recovered com-
pensatory and punitive damages. In a subsequent garnishment
action against the insurer, the lower court ruled that since the
terms of the insurance contract did not expressly exclude lia-
bility for punitive damages, the insurer was liable for the
total judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Kansas
public policy would prohibit recovery of punitive damages from
an insurer regardless of the express coverage of the insurance
contract, for allowing such coverage would defeat the punish-
ment and deterrent effects of punitive damage awards. Ameri-
can Surety Company v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1967).
Although often criticized as an historical relic,' punitive
damages are awarded in all but a few American jurisdictions2
when the tortfeasor has been grossly negligent, when his conduct
has been wilful, wanton, or reckless, or when he has committed
an intentional tort.3 While sometimes viewed as additional com-
1. One commentator claims that punitive damages first devel-
oped to compensate anguish and mental suffering before those elements
were covered by ordinary compensatory damages. Brin, Punitive Dam-
ages and Liability Insurance, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 265 (1964).
Punitive damages are often criticized because the defendant is
subjected to a civil procedure which competes with the function of
criminal law but which deprives him of the traditional safeguards of a
criminal trial. Moreover, there is a double jeopardy problem since the
accused is often subject to criminal prosecution for the same wrong that
gives rise to the punitive damage award. However, the constitutional
immunity against double jeopardy is considered to be aimed at criminal
procedure rather than a civil action in which punitive damages are
assessed. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Annot.,
42 A.L.R.2d 634 § 2(a); C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 77, at 277 [herein-
after cited as McCoRMICK].
2. Virtually all states permit some form of punitive damages.
However, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington allow puni-
tive damages only where specific statutory provisions decree. Louisi-
ana does not accept the doctrine, but uses the similar theory of multiple
damages. McComvIcK § 78; H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND
PROPERTY § 269 (1961) [hereinafter cited as OLECK].
3. See, e.g., Watkins v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 324 P.2d 130 (1958);
Frasier v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 159 Kan. 655, 157 P.2d 822 (1945). Gross
negligence is usually meant to signify "more than ordinary inadvertence
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pensation,4 the prevailing view is that punitive damages are
solely penal in nature, to be used in deterring future wrong-
doers, since the victim has been fully compensated by the dam-
age award based on his actual injuries.5 The fact that punitive
damages are available only either where the tort was intentional
or where extreme misconduct was in evidence is a further indi-
cation that they are penal.6
For most of this century American courts have almost in-
variably7 held that automobile insurers were liable for both
compensatory damages and punitive damages where an inten-
or inattention, but less than conscious indifference to consequences
.... [I]t is, in other words, merely an extreme departure from the
ordinary standard of care." Wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct, on
the other hand, differs in quality from ordinary negligence. Although it
does not go to the point of involving intent to harm, the wrongdoer's
conduct indicates that he "has intentionally done an act of an unreason-
able character in disregard of a risk knovm to him or so obvious that he
must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow." It is conduct involving "a
conscious indifference to the consequences, amounting almost to will-
ingness that they shall follow . .. ." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34,
at 187 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. For support of
Prosser's definitions see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 & § 282,
comment e at 10 (1965), where negligence is distinguished from reck-
lessness.
4. See, e.g., Battle v. Kilcrease, 54 Ga. App. 808, 189 S.E. 573
(1936); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Wright Titus,
Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1939). It is usually suggested that
punitive damages often serve as a reimbursement for the cost of bring-
ing litigation, especially where it is desirable to admonish the defend-
ant but where the actual damage is small. Morris, Punitive Damages in
Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1183 (1931). Punitive damages are
also considered as compensation to the plaintiff for the "added injury"
caused by the maliciousness of the defendant. 1 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE
OF DAMAGES § 347 (9th ed. 1912).
5. E.g., Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294 (1872); Motor Equip. Co.
v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 133 P.2d 149 (1943); Stalker v. Drake,
91 Kan. 142, 136 P. 912 (1913); McCoumvicK § 77; PROSSER § 2, at 9; Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, '70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 522 (1957).
6. An argument frequently but unsuccessfully made in the past is
that punitive damages awarded as a result of gross negligence or wilful,
wanton, and reckless conduct should be excluded from insurance
coverage because such extreme negligence is the same as an inten-
tional tort which is specifically excluded in most auto liability policies.
The courts have consistently rejected this theory on the ground that the
intent of the grossly negligent tortfeasor does not compare with that
of an intentional tortfeasor. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Cas.
Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 .6th Cir. 1956).
7. Two exceptions are Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96
Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533,
18 A.2d 357 (1941).
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tional tort was not involved s Many commentators have, how-
ever, encouraged the exclusion of punitive damages from insur-
ance coverage, 9 and over the past five years a strong trend has
developed to free insurers from liability for punitive damages.10
8. E.g. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Cas. Co. of America v.
Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 RI. 112,
120 A. 435 (1923), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Morrell, 264 U.S. 572 (1924). See also cases cited note 10
infra.
These decisions did not consider the public policy issue upon which
Gold focused but, like the lower court in the instant case, directed
themselves to the question of whether the language of the insurance
policy covered punitive damages. Typically, it was decided that the
boilerplate language binding the insurer "[t]o pay . . . all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages" covered
punitive as well as compensatory damages.
Another line of cases, often cited as holding the insurer liable, is
of doubtful value as precedent since the decisions were based on an
unusual statute which lumped both compensation and punishment to-
gether under the term punitive damages. Thus, it was impossible to
determine what part of the judgment should be excluded from insurance
coverage. Capitol Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897
(1939); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383
(1935). A third case, Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So.
671 (1937), extended the rule beyond the area covered by the unusual
statute.
9. For arguments for exclusion of punitive damages see OLEcK§ 275C; PROSSER § 2, at 13; Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile
Cases, 456 INs. L.J. 27 (1961); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HAav. L. REV. 517 (1957); Note, Insurance Coverage and the
Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. PrTT. L. REV.
144 (1957); 16 VAND. L. REV. 435 (1965); 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960).
10. It has been erroneously maintained that the current trend is
toward insurance coverage of punitive damages. Lambert, Does Lia-
bility Insurance Cover Punitive Damages?, 517 INs. L.J. 75 (1966). How-
ever, besides the instant case, four decisions since 1962 have excluded
punitive damages from automobile insurance coverage. Northwestern
Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Nicholson v.
American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Crull
v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa.
Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). In the same period only two cases have
taken the opposite view. Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d
908 (1965), in holding the insurer liable, completely ignored the public
policy issue. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn.
639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964), is the strongest recent decision directly oppos-
ing the Gold rationale. After finding that punitive damages were cov-
ered by the terms of the contract, Lazenby agreed that the dominant
purpose for punitive damages was ostensibly punishment and deter-
rence but rejected the public policy argument on three grounds.
First, the idea that punitive damages actually did deter socially irre-
sponsible drivers was deemed mere speculation, especially in the face of
existing criminal sanctions the effectiveness of which was also doubtful.
Next, since the language of the insurance policy had been construed by
19681 1109
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The Gold court carefully examined this recent trend and its
underlying policies, and rebutted some of the most compelling
attacks advanced against it.
The preliminary step in the Gold analysis was to dismiss the
language of the insurance contract as immaterial to any decision,
on the theory that if public policy forbade a specific type of
coverage, it could not be subverted by contract. 1
The Gold court next addressed itself to the nature of puni-
tive damages under Kansas law.12 The court found that the
state regards such damages exclusively as a punishment and a
deterrent of extreme misconduct wholly apart from any special
merit or need for compensation onl the part of the victim. 3
This concept of punitive damages became dispositive of the case
because the policy would be undermined if a wrongdoer could
pass the burden of the punishment on to his insurer. 4 In sup-
port of this concept the court noted than in an earlier case the
equitable notion that no one shall benefit from his own wrong
was used as the "major premise" for the determination of pub-
lic policy. 15 Hence recovery from the insurer was undesirable. 6
The court rejected the pragmatic argument that prohibiting
an insurance recovery of punitive damages would fail to deter
effectively the reckless or wanton driver. The court reasoned
that the effectiveness of the deterrent was not material, and that
the court's duty was to try to advance the state's policy of
most courts to cover both compensatory and punitive damages, policy
holders held the reasonable expectation that they were covered against
all claims. Finally, the line between simple negligence and the gross
negligence upon which an award for punitive damages can be made was
deemed too tenuous to permit such damages to go uninsured.
11. 375 F.2d at 525.
12. Id.
13. See Newman v. Nelson, 350 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1965); Watkins
v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 324 P.2d 130 (1953).
14. 375 F.2d at 526.
15. Id. at 525. The Gold court was referring to similar language
quoted in Northwestern Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir.
1962). In McNulty, however, the court stated that the doctrine was not
necessarily applicable to cases of automobile liability insurance covering
punitive damages since the public policy is not so much to discourage
wrongdoing by obstructing the hopes of profit as it is to discourage
wrongdoing through punishment.
16. Gold likened insurance against punitive damages to insurance
against criminal fines or penalties which would clearly violate public
policy. The court reasoned that insuring against punitive damages
tended to shift the burden of punishment to insurance companies and
through them to the public where it could serve no deterrent purpose.
375 F.2d at 526.
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awarding punitive damages as an attempt to deter.17 Moreover,
the court saw no merit in the argument that juries may dis-
tinguish between ordinary and gross negligence and reckless-
ness by whim rather than sound application of the law to the
facts."' Acknowledging the potential fallibility of juries, the
court maintained that it must assume the ability and accuracy
of any given jury in following the law.19
Further, the court dismissed the contention that the Kansas
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act 20 superseded the state
public policy against insuring for punitive damages. The legis-
lative purpose of the statute, reasoned the court, was to protect
the insured against injury by an uninsured motorist only in-
sofar as compensatory damage for bodily injury is concerned.
Hence, punitive damages were not contemplated by the Act
since they are not awarded as compensation for bodily injury.21
The Gold policy of barring punitive damages from insurance
coverage is a logical result of its view that a punitive damages
17. 375 F.2d at 527.
18. This argument is that the question of whether the damages
are covered by insurance will turn on the degree of misconduct that thejury perceives. If it considers the defendant's act wilful, wanton, and
reckless, a portion of the judgment will not be covered by insurance.
On the other hand, if the jury finds only ordinary negligence the de-
fendant will be completely covered.
While this contention may be valid, it is important to understand
exactly what happens. The compensatory damages, as decided by thejury, will always have complete insurance coverage up to the limits of
the policy. If the jury finds wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct it
awards additional punitive damages which are not insured but, instead,
fall completely upon the wrongdoer. Hence, the jury does not decide
whether the damage award should be covered by insurance, but
whether punitive damages should be awarded in addition to compensa-
tion. For the jury to accurately make these distinctions it is essential
that it be clearly instructed by the court as to the definitions of tortious
misconduct set forth in note 3 supra.
19. 375 F.2d at 527.
20. KAN. STAT. § 8-750 (b) (2) ( ). The Act states that the policy
"shall insure . . . against loss from the liability imposed by law for
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such
vehicle. .. "
21. 375 F.2d at 527. The court's analysis is weakened by the ab-
sence of discussion of the state legislature's intent in passing this
statute. However, this shortcoming is understandable in view of the
difficulty in obtaining this type of information at the state level. See
C. AUERBACH, L. GARRIsoN, W. HuRsT & S. MERMwN, THE LEGAL PROCESS
626 (1961).
Instead, the court utilized the alternative of citing cases from two
other jurisdictions which had interpreted similar statutes. Hanna v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Co., 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Laird v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
19681
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award is a punishment of and deterrent to the reckless driver.22
However, the court's argument that; "[t]he question is not so
much the efficacy of the policy underlying punitive damages;
rather it is a question of the implementation of that policy '"2 3
can be criticized. The court failed ta note that if punitive dam-
ages do not deter, there is no reason to have a public policy of
excluding them from insurance coverage. There is some doubt
that punitive damages will ever be a successful deterrent, no
matter how the policy is implemented, where they are awarded
in cases of gross negligence or recklessness rather than inten-
tional tort. It has been maintained, for instance, that where
there is no intent there can be no deterrent.24
Conversely, it can be argued that wilful, wanton, and reck-
less conduct is "quasi intent" since the actor knows that harm
is substantially certain to occur.25 If the latter premise is valid,
the deterrent effects of punitive damages logically follow. More-
over, it is possible that all undesirable behavior, including that
which is unintentional, can be deterred to some extent if the
punishment is sufficiently harsh.26
It is questionable whether punitive damages really fulfill a
deterrent function in this area. The most effective punish-
ments may often be the social stigma of the accident coupled
with the revocation of defendant's drivers license and the can-
cellation of his insurance. In the instant case, for example,
the wrongdoer's insurance policy was cancelled immediately.2 7
Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that the Gold view of punitive
damages as a punishment and deterrent is valid, arguments can
be made that the practical problems created in implementing
such a policy outweigh the deterrent value.
28
22. Where punitive damages are levied against an employer-car
owner for the wanton and reckless conduct of his employee the possi-
bility of punishing and deterring the defendant does not exist. Thus, the
insured may be allowed to shift the burden to the insurer. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 734 (1935) (held that allowing insurance coverage of punitive dam-
ages did not violate public policy where the insured was not guilty of
any misconduct).
23. 375 F.2d at 527.
24. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4312, at 132
(1965) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN].
25. PROSSER § 34, at 188.
26. See Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J.
987, 1014 (1940); Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51
MnN. L. REv. 789, 793 (1967); Michael, Psychiatry and the Criminal
Law, 21 A.B.A.J. 271 (1935).
27. Brief for Appellee at 12.
28. See note 9 supra.
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A number of these problems stem from the position of the
jury in an action for punitive damages. The Gold court summar-
fly rejected the argument that the portion of damages covered by
insurance would vary with the whim of the jury as it attempts
to distinguish between ordinary negligence and recklessness, 9
but the trial transcript in the instant case itself indicates the
highly unpredictable nature of the two types of jury awards. 30
Moreover, the function of the jury does pose a serious problem
because of the difficulty of effectuating the Gold policy within
the framework of the rules of court procedure.
First, there is a conflict between the general rule permitting
evidence of the financial standing of the defendant to be con-
sidered by the jury in assessing punitive damages31 and the rule
against referring to the defendant's insurance in the presence
of the jury.32  Although it would be paradoxical for a jury to
award punitive damages with the intention of punishing the de-
fendant while at the same time assuming that his insurance
would cover them, it is certainly possible that, without knowl-
edge of the exclusion of punitive damages from the insurance
coverage, a jury will follow this inconsistent approach. The
result could easily be an award of punitive damages out of pro-
portion to the actual wrong being punished since the jury will
assume that the burden will fall on the insurer.33
Two possible instructions might clarify this area for the
jury without violating the rule against introducing evidence of
the defendant's insurance. First, the court could emphasize the
personal nature of punitive damages thereby implying that the
full burden of the punitive damages will fall directly upon the
29. 375 F.2d at 527.
30. In the original transcript, at page 340, the trial judge stated:
Now in connection with the amount of damages involved, it
struck me that the jury could have very well turned this thing
around, giving actual damages in the amount of $10,000.00 and
punitive damages in the amount of $800.00 or whatever amount
it was .... It is a little large, but it strikes me that this
plaintiff is suffering from a rather serious disability....
Brief for Appellee at 12.
31. E.g., Witte v. Hutchins, 135 Kan. 776, 12 P.2d 724 (1932); White
v. White, 76 Kan. 82, 90 P. 1087 (1907); Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48,
125 N.W.2d 38 (1963).
32. E.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 152 Kan. 237, 103 P.2d 884 (1940);
Schultz v. Swift & Co., 210 Minn. 533, 299 N.W. 7 (1941). For a dis-
cussion of the rule see Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
33. There is little doubt that juries assume that the defendant is
covered by insurance even where no evidence of insurance is admitted
to the trial. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256
N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965); Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 317
INs. L.J. 411, 416 (1949).
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defendant. Second, it could be clearly stated that neither the
plaintiff's nor the defendant's insurance company would be in-
volved in the punitive award as either a payor or as a recipient.
While insurance would be mentioned in this latter instance, the
difference in context might be sufficient to avoid the evidence
rule.
A related difficulty is that the jury verdict is often given as a
lump sum 34 without distinction between compensatory and puni-
tive damages. 35 It is, therefore, impossible to determine what
portion of the damage award should be covered by insurance.3
This problem could be resolved by requiring the jury to cate-
gorize the damages when returning a verdict which includes
punitive damages. Not only would this practice aid in effectu-
ating the rule of the instant case, but it would also clearly define
the two types of damage awards. Such a clarification is also
necessary because there is some evidence that juries often assess
a portion of the judgment as a pumishment of the defendant
whether or not punitive damages are appropriate under the
law.37 Since the jury usually has a wider discretion in the
amount it can award as punitive damages than it does with
regard to compensation,38 it is imperative that courts clearly
instruct juries in the distinction between the two types of dam-
ages,39 even though such attempts may sometimes be in vain.40
34. In many jurisdictions the jury is not required to separate com-
pensatory and punitive damages unless a specific pilocation is requested
by one of the parties. E.g., Building Trades Council v. Thompson, 68
Nev. 384, 234 P.2d 581 (1951); Gallichio v. Gumina, 35 N.J. Super. 442,
114 A.2d 447 (1955); Jones v. Citizens :Bank, 58 N.M. 48, 265 P.2d 366
(1954); Kuhn v. Cooper, 141 W. Va. 33, 87 S.E.2d 531 (1955).
35. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 H&Rv.
L. Rzv. 517, 527 (1957).
36. All cases decided prior to 1962 holding that punitive damages
were covered by insurance involved a lump sum judgment that could
not be divided. See cases cited note 11 supra. In Pennsylvania Thresh-
ermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir.
1957), for example, the verdict and judgment was $5,000 with no distinc-
tion between compensatory and punitive damages.
37. Thus, where a Wisconsin case was tried three times before
different juries each verdict was for the same amount even though
punitive damages were allowed in only two of the trials. Bass v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874); 39 Wis. 636 (1876); 42 Wis. 654,
671-72 (1877). See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HA~v. L. REv. 517, 521 (1957).
38. See Bangert v. Hubbard, 127 Ind. App. 579, 126 N.E.2d 778
(1955); Krueger v. City of Fairbault, 220 Minn. 89, 18 N.W.2d 777 (1945);
Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959).
39. The law in the various jurisdictions, in many instances, has not
clearly defined the instructions that should be given to the jury con-
cerning the awarding of punitive damages. Morris, Punitive Damages
1114
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It has been argued that insurance companies would reduce
their important role in driver education and safety because of
their reduced liability under the Gold rule.41  The possibility
of such a reaction is mere conjecture at this point and would
seem to be highly unlikely in view of the rising level of com-
pensatory awards42 which are still the paramount cost to insur-
ers. Moreover, these safety programs have proven much less
effective for automotive activities than for other activities as-
sociated with casualty insurance.43
Other critics have pointed out that release of insurance com-
panies from liability for punitive damages will give them a
windfall since they already anticipate payments of these awards
in their premium rates. The fact that insurers set their rates on
a total cost system based on losses, expenses, and margin 4 sup-
ports this claim.45 Since courts have almost always held them
liable in the past,46 the expense of punitive damage awards has
naturally been a part of their total cost computation. The lim-
ited amount of litigation in this area also lends support to the
conclusion that insurers have not been deeply concerned with
these costs which have already been anticipated in their rates.
On the other hand, punitive damages, because of the infrequency
of their assessment, may well have a negligible effect upon the
premium cost.47 However, if a general acceptance of the policy
of excluding punitive damages from insurance coverage did pro-
duce a substantial windfall to insurers, it would hopefully be
short-lived since the total cost for the insurer would decrease.
The rates would be reduced in line with the savings under this
new policy,48 if not voluntarily by the companies themselves,
then certainly through the demands of the state regulatory au-
thorities.49
in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1187-88 (1931). See Note, Ex-
emplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 525 (1957).
40. See note 37 supra.
41. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th
Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring).
42. Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The In-
significance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 567 (1961).
43. F. HARPER & F. JA1mES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.5, at 777 (1956);
James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts,
15 LAw & CONTEMIP. PROB. 431, 440 (1950).
44. See A. MowBRAY & R. BLANCHARD, INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 389 (5th ed. 1961).
45. See 63 COLum. L. REv. 944, 950 (1963).
46. See cases cited note 8 supra.
47. Cf. Morris, supra note 42, at 575.
48. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
49. Although Congress has the power under the commerce clause
1968] 1115
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Another practical problem which arises from the Gold rule
is the conflict of interests which develops between the insurance
company and the insured when the insurer has no liability for
punitive damages. The insured and insurer may be discouraged
from disposing of the case through settlement because of the
resulting dispute as to what portion of such settlement is in-
sured. However, the problem is similar to that which develops
between joint tortfeasors ° and, therefore, should be capable of
solution by similar means.51
It has also been contended that: denying an insured cover-
age for a punitive award frustrates his expectations by voiding
the private contract between the insured and the insurer.5 2 It
is doubtful that the insured has specifically relied on the con-
tract for coverage of punitive damages since there is no mention
of punitive awards in the provisions of the standard policy.
However, it is more probable that the insured relied upon the
standard language which binds the company to defend the in-
sured in all litigation arising out of an accident involving the
of the Constitution to regulate insurance activities, it has, for the most
part, left this task up to the state regulatory commissions. A Mow-
BRAY & R. BLANCHARD, supra note 44, at 49, 485-88. These state regulatory
agencies have the authority to review and determine rates. F. CRANE,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 1, 57 (1962).
50. See PRossER § 47, at 277.
51. Where, for example, the plaintiff is claiming $10,000 compen-
satory and $10,000 punitive damages, and a settlement is made for
$7,500 there is a question as to what portion of that amount should be
covered by the insurance. One way to resolve the resulting dispute
would be to treat the amount of the settlement as wholly compensa-
tory damages since punitive damages are awarded only at the discretion
of the jury and, in the case of a settlement, there has been no trial.
Arguably, then, the amount in question must be considered compensa-
tory and within the coverage of liability insurance.
However, such a practice might discourage an insurer from settling
since it has less to lose and probably more to gain by allowing the jury
to make its determination. In the example, for instance, the insurer
can be liable only for a maximum of $10,000. But if the jury should
bring down a verdict of $8,000 and label half of that as punitive dam-
ages, the insurer has benefited from not settling. In light of this con-
flict, a more practical solution would be to apportion the settlement
amount according to the figures in the claim. For instance, if the
plaintiff filed a claim for $5,000 compensatory and $10,000 punitive dam-
ages a settlement would make the insurer liable for one-third and the
insured personally liable for two-thirds. This type of arrangement was
made in Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935), although on the basis of a prior jury
award.
52. See Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn.
639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
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insured vehicle. 5 Since the insurer may feel inclined to defend
only its part of the liability, the insured will be forced to secure
his own attorney for the punitive portion of the claim. To re-
solve this problem, the courts should require the insurer, on the
basis of its contract provision, to defend both claims.5 4 Such a
requirement would be fair to insurance companies since they
have an interest in minimizing the proofs of recklessness before
the jury, the same group of people who are determining the
amount of compensatory damages for which the insurer will be
liable. Evidence indicating that the defendant was guilty of
reckless conduct and gross negligence not only lays a basis for
the assessment of punitive damages, but it probably also affects
the level of the compensatory award.
Besides being unfair, the insured's ignorance of a Gold limi-
tation on his coverage minimizes the deterrent argument under-
lying punitive damages since a wrongdoer logically cannot be
deterred by a potential punishment of which he is unaware.5m
A possible remedy would be the adoption of state statutes spe-
cifically excluding punitive damages from coverage and requir-
ing insurance companies to include a provision disclaiming lia-
bility for punitive damages in their written contract.56 By put-
53. The language generally provides:
[A]s respects such insurance as is afforded by the terms of this
policy, the company shall defend in his name and behalf any
suit against the insured alleging [a claim covered by the policy]
and seeking damages on account thereof even if such suit is
groundless, false, or fraudulent; but the company may make
such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient.
Roos, The Obligation to Defend and Some Related Problems, 13 HAsTmaS
L.J. 206 (1961); Brief for Appellant at 3.
54. In fact this may already be the law in at least one jurisdic-
tion. In Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966),
the California Supreme Court held that an insurer was obliged to defend
an assault action notwithstanding an exclusionary clause disclaiming
liability for intentional torts inasmuch as the language of the policy did
not clearly define the application of the exclusionary clause to the duty
to defend. The failure to so define the clause, stated the court, gave
rise to the insured's reasonable expectation of protection. For further
discussion see Roos, The Obligation to Defend and Some Related Prob-
lems, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 206 (1961); Note, Insurance Company's Dilemma:
Defending Actions Against the Insured, 2 STAw. L. Euy. 383 (1950);
Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance
Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 734 (1966); 49 CAL. L. REV. 394 (1961).
55. This is not to say that there is no deterrent value when the
wrongdoers have no prior notice from the provisions of the policy.
Presumably anyone against whom punitive damages are assessed is de-
terred from a repetition of his wrong in the future.
56. The exclusion must be required by statute since it is unlikely
that an insurance company would risk the sales loss that might result
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